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Abstract—Operating system kernels are the security keystone
of most computer systems, as they provide the core protection
mechanisms. Kernels are in particular responsible for their own
security, i.e. they must prevent untrusted user tasks from reach-
ing their level of privilege. We demonstrate that proving such
absence of privilege escalation is a pre-requisite for any definitive
security proof of the kernel. While prior OS kernel formal verifi-
cations were performed either on source code or crafted kernels,
with manual or semi-automated methods requiring significant
human efforts in annotations or proofs, we show that it is possible
to compute such kernel security proofs using fully-automated
methods and starting from the executable code of an existing
microkernel with no modification, thus formally verifying absence
of privilege escalation with high confidence for a low cost. We
applied our method on two embedded microkernels, including the
industrial kernel AnonymOS1: with only 58 lines of annotation
and less than 10 minutes of computation, our method finds a
vulnerability in a first (buggy) version of AnonymOS and verifies
absence of privilege escalation in a second (secure) version.
I. INTRODUCTION
Context. The security of many computer systems builds
upon that of its operating system kernel. We define a kernel
as a computer program that prevents untrusted code from
performing arbitrary actions, in particular performing arbitrary
hardware and memory accesses2. Kernels that fail to prevent
this are said to be vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks3.
As this vulnerability is of the highest severity and can affect
any kernel, formally verifying that kernels cannot be exploited
by untrusted code to gain access to hardware privilege is of the
uttermost importance. Actually, proving absence of privilege
escalation (APE) is a mandatory step when attempting to for-
mally verify a kernel: nothing can be proven unconditionally
about a kernel unless this property holds.
Scope. Besides large well-known monolithic kernels (e.g.,
Linux, Windows, *BSD) whose size and complexity are
currently out of reach of formal verification, there is a rich
1The name was anonymized for the sake of double-blind review.
2This definition includes kernels and hypervisors with software-based [1]–
[3] or hardware-based isolation, but excludes the hardware abstraction layers
of operating systems without memory protection [4], [5].
3Many systems are still vulnerable to such attacks: more than 240 related
CVEs have been issued for the Linux kernel, and embedded systems are also
impacted—see VxWorks (CVE-2019-9865) and POK OS [6].
ecosystem of small-size kernels found in many industrial
applications, such as security or safety-critical applications,
embedded or IoT systems. This includes security-oriented ker-
nels like separation kernels [7], microkernels [8], exokernels
[9] and security-oriented hypervisors [10], [11] or enclave
software [12]; but also kernels used in embedded systems, for
example in microcontrollers [13], real-time [14], [15] or safety-
critical [16], [17] operating systems.
We focus on such small-size kernels. To have a practical
impact on these systems, a formal verification must be:
• Non-invasive: the verification should be applicable to the
kernel as it is. Formal verification methods that require
heavy annotations or rewrite in a new language are highly
expensive and require developers with a rare combination
of expertises (OS and formal methods);
• Automated: the cost and effort necessary to perform a
formal verification should be minimized. Formal verifi-
cation techniques that are manual (e.g., proof assistants)
or semi-automated (e.g., deductive verification) require a
large proof or annotation effort;
• Close to the running system: Verification should be
performed on the machine code [18], [19] in order to
remove the whole build chain (compiler, linker, compi-
lation options, etc.) from the trust base. Machine code
verification is all the more important on kernels, as they
contain many error-prone low-level interactions with the
hardware, not described by the source-level semantics.
Despite significant advances in the last decades [2], [8], [11],
[12], [18], [20]–[26], existing kernel verification methods do
not address these issues. In most cases, verification is applied
to microkernels developed or rewritten for the purpose of
formal verification (except [22]), and is performed only on
source [21], [22] or assembly [2], [11], [25], [26], using highly
expensive manual [8], [18], [21], [22] or semi-automated [2],
[11], [12], [23], [24] methods. For example, the functional
verification of the SeL4 microkernel [8] required 200,000 lines
of annotations and still left parts of the code unchecked (boot,
assembly).
Goal and challenges. We focus on the key property of privi-
lege escalation, and seek to design a fully-automated program
analysis able to prove the absence of privilege escalation
in microkernels for embedded systems, directly from their
executable. Besides the well-documented difficulty of static
analysis of machine code [27], solving this goal poses two
main technical challenges:
• Automatically proving absence of privilege escalation
requires a formal definition that is generic (i.e. indepen-
dent of the kernel) and suitable to the machine-code
level. Indeed, absence of privilege escalation is usually
established through higher-level properties such as safety
of control-flow and memory together with preservation
of invariants on protection mechanisms [11], but each
of these properties requires an in-depth specification of
the kernel behavior and knowledge of its source code—
preventing automated machine-level verification. In addi-
tion this definition should be amenable to static analysis,
preferably using standard techniques;
• Most kernels are parameterized systems designed to run
an arbitrary number of tasks. This is also true for micro-
kernels in embedded systems: even if the number of tasks,
size of scheduling tables and communication buffers
often do not vary during execution, they depend on the
application using the kernel. A flat representation of
memory (enumerating all memory cells) [24] is no longer
sufficient in such a setting, and we need more complex
representations able to precisely summarize memory, like
shape abstract domains [28], [29]. Unfortunately, they
usually require a large amount of manual annotations,
which defeats our goal of automation.
Contributions. We propose BINSEC/CODEX, a novel static
analysis for proving absence of privilege escalation in micro-
kernels from their executable. Our contributions include:
• An original formal model (Section III) suitable for defin-
ing privilege escalation attacks on parameterized kernel
code and allowing to reduce the proof of absence of priv-
ilege escalation to a standard program analysis problem
(finding non-trivial state invariants, Theorem 4), hence
reusing the standard program analysis machinery. We also
prove that absence of privilege escalation is the most
fundamental kernel property, without which nothing can
be proved (Theorem 3);
• A new 3-step methodology (Section IV) for proving
absence of privilege escalation of parameterized kernels
from their executable, featuring 1. automated extrac-
tion of most of the analysis (shape) annotations from
kernel types; 2. parameterized fully-automated binary-
level static analysis inferring an invariant of the kernel
under a precondition on the user tasks, and 3. fully-
automated method to check that the user tasks satisfy
the inferred precondition;
• A novel weak shape abstract domain (Section V) able
to verify the preservation of memory properties in pa-
rameterized kernels. This domain is efficient (thanks to a
dual flow sensitive/flow insensitive representation), easily
configurable (based on the memory layout of C types,
most of the annotations are extracted automatically), and
suitable to machine code verification (e.g., addressing
indexing of data structures using numerical offsets);
• A thorough evaluation of our method on two different
microkernels (Section VI), using two different instruction
sets (x86 and ARMv7) and memory protection mecha-
nisms (segmentation and pagination). This includes the
study of an ARM Cortex-A9 port of AnonymOS4. The
method is able to find a vulnerability in a beta version
of this kernel, and to verify the absence of privilege
escalation in a later version, in less than 450 seconds
and with only 58 lines of manual annotations— several
order of magnitudes less than prior verification efforts
(Table IV, p. 13).
This work is the first OS verification effort to specifically
address absence of privilege escalation. It is also the first to
perform formal verification on an existing operating system
kernel without any modification, on machine code, and the
first to do so using a fully-automated technique able to
handle parametrization. Finally, it is the first shape analysis
performed on machine code.
We thus show that, contrary to a widespread belief [8], fully-
automated methods like static analysis can be used to verify
complex properties such as absence of privilege escalation in
embedded microkernels, directly from their executable.
Limitations. Like any sound static analyzer,
BINSEC/CODEX may be too imprecise on some code
patterns, emitting false alarms. Currently, our analysis cannot
handle dynamic task spawning nor dynamic modification
of memory repartition, as well as self-modification or code
generation in the kernel. Still, many microkernels and
hypervisors fall in our scope [6], [7], [10], [11], [14]–[17],
[22], [30].
Finally, while absence of privilege escalation is arguably the
most important property of a kernel, verifying task separation
is also of great importance. This is left as future work.
II. OVERVIEW
A. System description, attacker model and trust base
System description. We consider a computer system consist-
ing in hardware running both untrusted software (user tasks)
and security-critical software (including the kernel). Our goal
is to ensure that the only code running as privileged is the
uncompromised, security-critical code, where being privileged
4AnonymOS is a concurrent industrial microkernel developed by
AnonymFirm1, a leading tool provider for safety-critical real-time systems,
with presence in the aerospace, automative, and industrial automation markets.
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Fig. 1. The typical system loop between kernel and user tasks.
typically corresponds to having a hardware flag set (supervisor
mode). Section III formalizes these notions.
Attacker model. The attack goal is to escalate privilege, either
by running untrusted software with privilege or by injecting
code into the security-critical software.
The attacker controls the user image—containing the user
tasks code and data— loaded with the kernel before boot;
can perform any software-based attack, such as modifying
user task code and memory at runtime; but cannot make
the hardware deviate from its specification, and thus cannot
perform physical attacks nor exploit hardware backdoors or
glitches [31].
Trust base. We want to trust a minimal number of compo-
nents:
• the software used to load the kernel and user tasks in
memory (bootloader, EEPROM flasher, etc.),
• the tools used to perform the formal verification.
Note that we do not need to trust the kernel source code
nor any software producing the executable (e.g., compiler,
assembler, linker, or build scripts).
B. Illustrative example of an OS kernel
To better understand privilege escalation attacks, how a
kernel is structured to prevent these attacks, and how we verify
that these attacks are impossible, we use, as an example, the
barebone OS kernel of Figure 2. Although minimal, it handles
an arbitrary number of tasks and features scheduling, memory
protection and multiple levels of privilege. In particular, it
should protect itself from the user tasks and be immune
to privilege escalation attacks. The exemple is written in
pseudo-C, but remember that our analysis is performed on
machine code.
Execution context of a task. This kernel performs context
switching between pre-defined tasks. Assuming a stack ma-
chine programming model, an execution context is defined
here by a read-only executable code segment, a writable
data segment holding the stack, a status register flags, and
two registers pc (program counter) and sp (stack pointer)
respectively pointing inside the code and data segments.
Privilege level. A bit inside the flags register indicates
whether execution is privileged. Being privileged allows ex-
ecuting instructions that would change the privilege in the
flags registers, or would change the values of the system
registers (mpu1, mpu2, pc
′, sp′ and flags′), using ′ to
denote what is sometimes called banked or shadow registers.
Memory protection. A running task can access only the
memory inside its code and data segment. This is enforced
by the hardware through a Memory Protection Unit (MPU)
controlled by two system registers mpu1 and mpu2. Each
mpu register enables access to the memory addresses in a
certain range for reading, writing or execution, depending
on the contents of the register. When the processor is in
unprivileged mode, all other memory accesses are forbidden,
while in privileged mode the MPU is bypassed and the whole
memory can be accessed.
Kernel. The kernel is the only program which is supposed to
run privileged. Kernel execution proceeds as follows:
1) First, an interrupt occurs, which is the only way to
switch from unprivileged to privileged execution. The
hardware saves the context of the executing task and
begins executing the kernel. In our example, the hardware:
(a) saves the value of pc, sp, and flags; (b) restores the
kernel stack pointer sp to the kernel stack and restores
flags to allow privileged execution; and (c) sets pc to
begin executing the kernel function;
2) Then, the kernel dispatches the execution according to the
interrupt received. The only special case is the RESET
interrupt, which boots (i.e. initializes) the system. Here,
it consists in setting cur, a variable always pointing to
the task that has been or will be executed. For all other
interrupts the system is already executing a task, and its
execution context must be saved in memory before we
can switch to another task;
3) After that, the kernel chooses another task to be sched-
uled—here with a simple round-robin method, so it is
sufficient to follow the next field in a circular list;
4) Then, the kernel switches to the context of the task being
executed. Besides restoring the working values of the
registers previously saved, the kernel correctly sets up
the memory protection by updating system registers mpu1
and mpu2;
5) Finally the kernel returns from the interrupt, swapping
the values of pc, sp, and flags with their primed
counterparts. Here, the kernel relies on the invariant that
flags′ is such that after this instruction, the processor
will be in unprivileged mode.
Note that interrupts are masked during kernel execution, i.e.
kernel execution cannot be interrupted.
User image. System execution depends on the kernel code,
but is also parameterized by the user (tasks) image, part of
the initial state. Here, the image is made by C code statically
allocating Task data structures, such that: (1) their pc and sp
fields point into their respective code and stack sections; (2)
the code_segment and data_segment fields should give
the appropriate rights to these sections; (3) flags ensures
that execution is not privileged; and (4) the next fields are
such that all tasks in the system are in a circular list. Figure 9
(Appendix, p. 16) gives an example of C code for a user image.
Getting a working system simply requires to compile the
user image and load it with the kernel. Such static system
generation is common in embedded systems, where OS ven-
dors and application developpers are separate entities.
C. Threats and mitigation
Attacks. This kernel is secure in that it effectively prevents
privilege escalation. However, slight changes in its behavior
could allow a variety of attacks that we illustrate here:
• Attacks targeting memory safety: data corruption on one
of the flags field of a Task would allow a user task to
raise its privilege. Corruption can come e.g. from a stack
overflow or following an invalid next or cur pointer;
typedef struct {
int32 pc, sp, flags;
int64 code segment, data segment;
struct task ∗next;
} Task;
Task ∗cur;
extern Task task0;
register int32 sp, pc, flags, sp′, pc′, flags′;
register int64 mpu1, mpu2;
void kernel(int32 interrupt number) {
/∗ Interrupt transition, done in hardware. ∗/
swap(sp′, sp); swap(flags′, flags); swap(pc′, pc); pc =&kernel;
/∗ Save context unless during boot. ∗/
if(interrupt number == RESET)
{ cur = &task0; }
else
{ cur→sp = sp′; cur→pc = pc′; cur→flags = flags′; }
/∗ Scheduler. ∗/
cur = cur→next;
/∗ Context restore. ∗/
mpu1 = cur→code segment; mpu2 = cur→data segment;
sp′ = cur→sp; pc′ = cur→pc; flags′ = cur→flags;
/∗ Return from interrupt (often done in hardware) ∗/
swap(sp′, sp); swap(flags′, flags); swap(pc′, pc); }
Fig. 2. Example: a minimalist OS kernel running on ideal hardware
• Attacks targeting memory protection: data corruption on
the code_segment or data_segment field of a
Task would allow to extend the memory that the task can
access, allowing further code injection or data corruption;
• Attacks targeting control-flow: changing the control-flow
of the program to an unexpected execution path can lead
to privilege escalation. For instance the attacker could use
a stack smashing attack to jump to the instruction storing
to cur→flags, with a wrong value.
Absence of privilege escalation is a fragile property. On the
other hand, once verified, it implies that all of the above
attacks are impossible or have only a limited impact.
Guarantee against attacks. An (inductive) invariant is a
property that holds for all reachable states, because it is
initially true and inductive (i.e. remains true after the execution
of an instruction). Our method guarantees that no software-
based attack can lead to privilege escalation by automatically
finding an invariant implying that only the kernel code can
execute with hardware privilege (and that this code cannot
be modified). To be inductive, this invariant also contains
properties about memory, control-flow and correct working
of the memory protection mechanism. The properties below
belong to the invariant computed by our method on the exam-
ple kernel:
• Control-flow safety: All the instructions executed in priv-
ileged mode are those of the kernel function, whose
code is never modified;
• Memory safety: All memory accesses done by the kernel
are inside its stack, the cur global variable, or inside one
of the Task. The stack never overflows, and the stack
pointer at the kernel entry is constant;
• Working hardware protection: The flags′ register
and the flags field in every Task ensure that ex-
ecution is unprivileged. The two mpu registers, the
code_segment and data_segment fields in every
Task, do not contain write access to the kernel memory;
• Shape invariants: The cur variable (after boot) and the
next field in every Task always point to a Task; each
Task is separated from the others and from kernel data.
The problem of defining Absence of Privilege Escalation.
Absence of privilege escalation does not per se imply memory
safety nor control-flow safety—even if our approach proves
these properties on the example kernel as a byproduct. Indeed,
not all bugs are security critical, and a system suffering from
a limited 1-byte stack overflow can still be secure while not
respecting strict memory safety. Also, control-flow safety and
memory-safety are very hard to define at machine code-level,
as we lack information about code and data layout.
Hence, a first challenge here is to provide a formal definition
of Privilege Escalation suitable to machine code analysis.
D. The case for automated verification of OS kernels
We can distinguish three classes of verification methods:
• manual [8], [17], [18], [21], [22]: the user has to provide
for every program point a candidate invariant, then prove
via a proof assistant that every instruction preserves these
candidate invariants;
• semi-automated5 [2], [10]–[12], [23], [24]: the user has
to provide the candidate invariants at some key program
points (kernel entry and exit, loop and function entries
and exits) and then use automated provers to verify
that all finite paths between these points preserve the
candidate invariants;
• fully-automated: a sound static analyzer [32] automati-
cally infers correct invariants for every program point.
The user only provides invariant templates by selecting
or configuring the required abstract domains.
Experience has shown that in OS formal verification “invari-
ant reasoning dominates the proof effort”6 [8], [20], motivat-
ing our choice for fully-automated methods.
E. Challenges
Besides a suitable definition of Privilege Escalation, analy-
zing real microkernels adds extra challenges.
Machine code analysis. Binary-level static analysis is already
very challenging on its own [27], [33], [34] as (1) the control-
flow graph is not known in advance because of computed
jumps7 (e.g. jmp @sp) whose resolution requires runtime
values, (2) memory is a single large array of bytes with no
5Some authors call this technique automated; we use the word semi-
automated to emphasize the difference with fully-automated methods.
6Klein et al. reports that 80% of the effort in SeL4 is spent stating and
verifying invariants [8].
7Computed jumps are commonly introduced by compilers: return opera-
tions, function pointers, optimized compilation of C-like switch statements,
dynamic method dispatch in OO-languages, etc.
prior typing nor partitioning, and (3) data manipulations are
very low-level (masks, flags, legitimate overflows, low-level
comparisons, etc.).
Precondition. Absence of privilege escalation may be true
only for user images that match a given precondition. For
instance our example kernel is vulnerable to privilege esca-
lation if initially task0.next can point inside the kernel
stack, or if task0.code_segment allows modifying the
cur variable.
This suggests verifying the kernel assuming this precondi-
tion, and then checking that the user image satisfy the pre-
condition. But writing this initial precondition would require
a manual effort, going against having an automated analysis.
Boot code. Verifying boot code has its own difficulties: (1)
type invariants holding at runtime may not hold in the initial
state, so we have to verify their establishment rather than
their preservation; (2) boot code often includes hard-to-analyze
patterns such as dynamic memory allocation or creation of
memory protection tables. Consequently, boot code is some-
times left unverified [8], and achieving perfect automatic
analysis on boot code (0 false alarm) is very difficult.
Parametrization. If the number of tasks is not fixed, the
kernel cannot find the memory location of data structures such
as Task at fixed addresses in memory. A flat representation
of memory [24] is no longer sufficient, and we need more
complex representations able to precisely summarize memory
(i.e. shape analyses [28], [29], [35]). Such analyses often
require a tedious annotations, which defeats automation.
Concurrency. Operating system kernels are often concurrent
because of nested interrupts, preemptive kernel threads, or
(as in our case study) because the hardware provides several
processors. Concurrency brings issues of analysis performance
and precision.
III. ABSENCE OF PRIVILEGE ESCALATION
We present here a formalization of absence of privilege
escalation (APE) suitable to automated verification. Theorem 4
reduces this problem so that it can be tackled with standard
methods—computation of state invariants.
The specific instantiation of this formalization to hardware-
protected OS kernel can be found in Appendix B, p. 16.
A. Privilege escalation
We model a system (comprising the hardware, the operating
system and the user tasks) as a transition system 〈S, S0,→〉,
where S is the set of all possible states in the system, S0
the set of possible initial states, and → ∈ S × S represents
the possible transitions: “s1 → s2” means that executing one
instruction starting from state s1 can result in state s2.
unprivileged privileged
kernel-controlled ✓ ✓
attacker-controlled ✓ privilege escalation
Fig. 3. Privilege escalation happens when the system reaches a privileged
state controlled by the attacker.
A predicate privileged : S→ Bool tells whether a state has
access to the privilege under study. In a typical OS kernel,
this predicate corresponds to the value of a hardware register
containing the hardware privilege level. The privilege level
restricts how a state can evolve in a→ transition. For instance
on usual processors, system registers cannot be modified when
in an unprivileged state.
Two entities are sharing their use of the system, called the
kernel and the attacker. A predicate A-controlled : S→ Bool
tells which entity controls the execution (returning true if it is
the attacker, and false if it is the kernel). In the kernels that
we consider, a state is kernel-controlled if the next instruction
that it executes comes from the kernel executable file and was
never modified; all the other states are considered attacker-
controlled.
This formalization corresponds to an attack model where
the attacker chooses the untrusted software running on a
system, but cannot change the security-critical software nor
the hardware behavior.
Definition 1 (Privilege escalation). We define privilege esca-
lation of a transition system 〈S, S0,→〉 as reaching a state
which is both privileged and controlled by the attacker.
privilege escalation , ∃s :


privileged(s)
∧ A-controlled(s)
∧ ∃s0 ∈ S0 : s0 →
∗ s
where →∗ is the transitive closure of the → relation.
Thus, an attacker can escalate its privilege by either gaining
control over privileged kernel code (e.g., by code injection),
or by leading the kernel into giving it its privilege (e.g., by
corrupting memory protection tables).
B. Parameterized verification
The previous definition cannot be used for parameterized
verification, because the execution of the system depends
on what is executed by the attacker. We solve this problem
by defining a new semantics for machine code which is
independent from the attacker’s execution.
1) Regular and interrupt transitions: We partition the tran-
sition relation into regular transitions and interrupt transitions:
s→ s′ , s
interrupt
→ s′ ∨ s
regular
→ s′
The regular transition
regular
→ from states s to s′ corresponds to
the execution of an instruction i ∈ I, the set of all instructions.
s
regular
→ s′ , s′ ∈ exec(s, next(s))
next : S → I fetches and decodes the next instruction,
while exec : S × I → P(S) executes this instruction (which
may be non-deterministic). We assume that regular transitions
s
regular
→ s′ either preserve the current privilege level or evolve
from a privileged state to an unprivileged state, but cannot
evolve from an unprivileged state to a privileged one. The
interrupt transition
interrupt
→ is thus the only way to evolve from
unprivileged to privileged. In OS kernels, it corresponds to the
reception of hardware or software interrupts.
2) Empowering the attacker: Note that the → transition is
defined only when the instruction under execution is known,
which prevents parameterized verification. That is why we
define a new transition system 〈S, S0, 〉 with the same sets
S and S0, but with a new transition relation  .
We first define the
A
 relation which over-approximates the
transitions that an attacker can effectively perform (i.e., we
make the attacker more powerful). Instead of being able to
execute only one known instruction next(s), the attacker will
now be able to execute sequences of arbitrary instructions:
s
A
 s′′ , s′′ = s ∨ (∃i, s′ : s
A
 s′ ∧ s′′ ∈ exec(s′, i))
The  relation restricts the ability to execute arbitrary
instructions to attacker-controlled states; when a state is kernel-
controlled, the normal transition apply. In addition, interrupt
transitions are also possible in attacker-controlled states.
s s′ , s→ s′ ∨ (A-controlled(s) ∧ s
A
 s′)
Theorem 1. The set of reachable states for the 〈S, S0,→〉
transition system is included in the set of states reachable for
〈S, S0, 〉.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that for every s,
{s′ : s→ s′} ⊆ {s′ : s s′}
Corollary 1. If there are no privilege escalation in the transi-
tion system 〈S, S0, 〉, there are also no privilege escalation
in the transition system 〈S, S0,→〉
Proof. This is the contrapositive of the fact that if a state exists
in 〈S, S0,→〉 where privilege escalation happens, this state
also exists in 〈S, S0, 〉.
Thanks to Corollary 1, the 〈S, S0, 〉 transition system
can be used to prove absence of privilege escalation instead
of 〈S, S0,→〉, with the benefit of establishing this proof
independently from a particular concrete attacker.
C. Proof strategy
We now show that we can recast absence of privilege
escalation to ease its formal verification.
1) Absence of privilege escalation as a state property: A
state property (∈ S→ Bool) is a predicate over states. A state
property is satisfied if it is true in every reachable state.
Theorem 2. A transition system does not have privilege
escalation if, and only if, it satisfies the secure property, where
secure(s) , ¬(A-controlled(s) ∧ privileged(s))
Recasting absence of privilege escalation as a state property
provides a method to prove this property. The idea is to find a
state invariant: a property p which holds on every initial state
s ∈ S0 and is inductive (i.e. p(s)∧s → s
′ ⇒ p(s′)), and thus
holds on each reachable state. If this invariant p is stronger
than secure, this proves that we cannot reach a state which is
both attacker-controlled and privileged.
2) Reasoning about consequences of privilege escalation:
Given how we empowered the attacker, we can also reason
about the consequences of a privilege escalation: indeed the
definition of  implies that the attacker will do everything
that it can do. Thus, to prove absence of privilege escalation in
〈S, S0,→〉, one can prove that a bad consequence of privilege
escalation never happens in 〈S, S0, 〉.
In the rest of the paper, we will consider that bad conse-
quence is given by the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Running an arbitrary sequence of privileged
instructions allows to reach any possible state.
This assumption is reasonable for every system that confines
an adversarial code in some kind of container, as escaping
such a container means getting rid of any restrictions on
the possible actions. In the case of hardware protected OSes,
executing an arbitrary sequence of instructions with hardware
privilege allows changing any register or memory location,
thus reaching any state. Using this assumption we can prove
the following theorem:
Theorem 3. If a transition system 〈S, S0, 〉 is vulnerable to
privilege escalation, then the only satisfiable state property in
the system is the trivial state invariant ⊤, true for every state.
Proof. If a privilege escalation vulnerability exists, then any
state can be reached, as executing an arbitrary sequence of
instructions starting from a privileged state can lead to any
state. The only state invariant that is true on every state is ⊤.
We define as non-trivial any state invariant different from ⊤.
Theorem 4. If a transition system satisfies a non-trivial state
invariant, then it is invulnerable to privilege escalation attacks.
Proof. By contraposition, and the fact that state invariants are
satisfiable state properties.
Theorems 3 & 4 have two crucial practical implications:
• If privilege escalation is possible, the only state property
that holds in the system is ⊤, making it impossible
to prove definitively any useful property. Thus, proving
absence of privilege escalation is a necessary first step
for any formal verification of an OS kernel;
• The proof of any state property different from ⊤ implies
as a byproduct the existence of a piece of code able to
protect itself from the attacker, i.e. a kernel with protected
privileges. In particular, we can prove absence of privilege
escalation automatically, by successfully finding any non-
trivial state invariant with a sound static analyzer.
IV. BINSEC/CODEX FOR OS VERIFICATION
In Section III we have reduced the problem of proving
absence of privilege escalation to the problem of finding a
non-trivial system invariant. We now detail our methodology
to find such an invariant.
A. Background: general principles
Abstract interpretation [32] is a method for building sound
static analyzers that can infer program invariants and verify
program properties. Using it, we can compute a set of states
guaranteed to be larger than the set of reachable states for the
〈S, S0, 〉 transition system. If this computed set is different
from S, this proves that a non-trivial invariant exists.
Abstract interpretation works by computing abstract val-
ues—elements of abstract domains—representing a set of
states. Abstract domains are iteratively computed until a
(post-)fixpoint is reached, yielding an over-approximation of
the set of reachable states. This over-approximation allows to
trade precision for termination. Such abstract domains range
from simple (intervals) to complex (polyhedra), offering vari-
ous trade-offs between precision and scalability, and domains
can be combined together [36].
In practice, designing an abstract interpreter amounts to
defining or choosing a combination of abstract domains tai-
lored to the problem at hand.
Intermediate representation for machine code analysis. In-
termediate Representations (IR) [37]–[39] are the cornerstone
of modern binary-level code analyzers, used to lift the different
binary Instruction Set Architectures into a single and simple
language. We rely on the IR of BINSEC [38], [40], called
DBA—other IRs are similar. Its syntax is shown Figure 4.
〈stmt〉 := store 〈e〉 〈e〉 | 〈reg〉← 〈e〉 | goto 〈e〉
| 〈stmt〉;〈stmt〉 | if 〈e〉 〈stmt〉 else 〈stmt〉
〈e〉 := 〈cst〉 | 〈reg〉 | load 〈e〉 | 〈unop〉 〈e〉 | 〈e〉 〈binop〉 〈e〉
〈unop〉 := ¬ | − | uextn | sextn | extracti..j
〈binop〉 := 〈arith〉 | 〈bitwise〉 | 〈cmp〉 | concat
〈arith〉 := + | − | × | udiv | urem | sdiv | srem
〈bitwise〉 := and | or | xor | shl | shr | sar
〈cmp〉 := = | 6= | >u | <u | >s | <s
Fig. 4: Low-level IR for binary code
DBA is a minimalist language comprising only a single type
of elements (bitvector values) and four types of instructions:
register assignments, memory stores, conditionals, and jumps
(static and computed). Expressions contain memory load, as
well as standard modular arithmetic and bit-level operators.
Values are stored in registers or in memory (a single byte-level
array), the imperative semantics is standard. This is enough to
encode the functional semantics of major instructions sets—
including x86 and ARM.
B. Key ingredients
In Section III we have simplified the problem of proving
absence of privilege escalation, to the problem of finding a non-
trivial system invariant. We intend to use binary-level static
analysis to infer and verify this invariant automatically.
In practice, this requires developing a static analysis for
machine code and run it on the system loop (Figure 1).
We define a special transfer function to handle the
A
 (user
code) transition, that removes knowledge about the contents
of registers and memory accessible from the loaded memory
protection table. This approach should work if the system is
not parameterized, i.e. when the system is completely known,
or at least the memory layout of user tasks is known [18],
[24].
Yet, we face two problems here: (1) binary-level static
analysis is already very challenging on its own [27], [33], [34]
(Section II-E)— see, e.g., the boot code analysis in our case
study; (2) the systems we are interested in are parameterized.
Our methodology builds upon three key ingredients.
Key 0: An up-to-date binary-level static analysis. We build
a state-of-the-art sound static analyzer for machine code (Sec-
tion IV-D), picking among the best practices from the literature
[27], [33], [34], [41]–[43]. Interestingly, while prior works
is partitioned [27] into raw binary analysis (no assumption,
adequate to adversarial analysis such as malware but extremely
difficult to get precise) and standardly-compiled code analysis
(with hard-coded extra assumptions8), our own method does
target standardly-compiled code but the extra assumptions are
explicit (shape annotations) and fully checked.
Key 1: A type-based weak shape abstract domain. We
propose a novel weak shape abstract domain (Section V) based
on the layout of types in memory. This fulfills many roles:
• Being a shape domain, it can be used to summarize the
memory and allows representation of addresses which is
scalable (no enumeration) and precise;
• Types and type invariants can encode the precondition on
(the shape of) user images in a simple way;
• Being based on types, most of the annotations can be
extracted from the type declarations of the kernel code.
This provides a base set of annotations for the shape
domain, that is easy to strengthen using type invariants.
Key 2: Differentiated handling of boot and runtime. Con-
trary to runtime code, the boot code does not preserve data
structure invariants but establishes them. Thus, parameterized
verification (with 0 false alarms) of boot code is complex. On
the other hand, when the user image is known, boot code
execution is almost deterministic (except from small sources
of non-determinism: multicore handling, device initialization,
etc.), mostly analyzable by simple interpretation.
We propose an asymmetric treatment of boot code and
runtime: our parameterized analysis completely ignores the
alarms in boot code, meaning that when reaching 0 alarm in
the runtime, we get a system invariant I under the precondition
that the state after boot is in I . The latter is then verified by
analyzing (mostly, interpreting) the boot code with a given
user tasks image.
C. Putting things together: the 3-step methodology
Our methodology (Figure 5) consists in three steps:
1. Automated annotation. We automatically extract type
declarations from the kernel (currently using the DWARF
debug section in either the kernel or user image executable,
but extraction from source code is also feasible), and (option-
ally) strengthen them with simple type invariant annotations
8Typically, assumptions on control flow (trust in an external disassembler)
or memory partitioning (e.g., stack is separated from the rest of memory).
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Fig. 5. 3-step methodology for system invariant computation.
(presented in Appendix A). This produces shape annotations
configuring the kernel analysis;
2. Parameterized static analysis. Then, we launch the static
analyzer on the kernel (boot code and runtime code) using the
shape annotations configuring the shape abstract domain. The
result is an invariant for the runtime I under the precondition
that the state after boot satisfies I .
3. User tasks checking. Given a user image, we then interpret
the boot code and check that its final state indeed satisfies the
invariant precondition on the kernel runtime. If it does, we
have a system invariant— if not trivial it guarantees absence
of privilege escalation.
D. Binary-level static analysis
Outside of our type-based weak shape abstract domain
(Section V), our analyzer builds on state-of-the-art techniques
for machine code analysis:
Control flow. Control and data are strongly interwoven at
binary level, since resolving computed jumps (e.g., jmp @sp)
requires to precisely track values in registers and memory,
while on higher-level languages retrieving a good approxima-
tion of the CFG is simple. Following Kinder or Ve´drine et
al. [33], [41], our analysis computes simultaneously the CFG
and value abstractions;
Values. We mainly use efficient non-relational abstract do-
mains (reduced product of the signed and unsigned meaning
of bitvectors [34], and congruence information [44]), comple-
mented with symbolic relational information [34], [45], [46]
for local simplifications of sequences of machine code;
Memory. Our memory model is ultimately byte-level in order
to deal with very low-level coding aspects of microkernels.
Yet, as representing each memory byte separately is inefficient
and imprecise, we use a stratified representation of memory
caching multi-byte loads and stores, like Mine´ [47]. In addi-
tion, the tracked memory addresses are found on demand;
Precision. To have sufficient precision, notably to enable
strong updates to the stack, our analysis is flow and fully
context-sensitive (i.e. inline the analysis of functions), which
is made possible by the small size and absence of recursion
typical of microkernels. Moreover we unroll the loops when
the analysis finds a bound on their number of iterations;
Concurrency. We handle shared memory zones through a
flow-insensitive abstraction making them independent from
thread interleaving [48]. Our weak shape abstract domain
(Section V) represents one part of the memory in a flow-
insensitive way. For the other zones we identify the shared
memory zones by intersecting the addresses read and written
by each thread [49], and only perform weak updates on them.
More formal details are given in Appendix C (p. 17).
V. A TYPE-BASED WEAK SHAPE ABSTRACT DOMAIN
The weak shape abstract domain is designed to verify the
preservation of memory layouts expressed using a particular
dependent type system, tailored to the analysis of machine
code (e.g., using subtyping to access field offsets implicitly).
A. Types and labeling of memories
Our memory abstraction considers only memories that fol-
low constraints coming from how C compilers lay out values
in memory. We interpret a C declaration like Task task0 as
having two distinct meanings: first, that the memory addresses
occupied by task0 is labeled as being a Task; second,
that the contents of task0 are in the set of values that a
Task should contain. In particular, task0.next should only
contain addresses with a Task label.
Formally, we will define types T, labelings L ∈ A→ T of
addresses, interpretations L·ML of types as set of values, and
memories m ∈ A → V; and we will consider only (m,L )
pairs such that L is a labeling for m, a relation defined as
∀a ∈ A : m[a] ∈ LL (a)ML
and meaning that each address a in a memory m should
contain a value m[a] whose type is L (a).
Types. We build a new type system upon that of C, with the
following syntax for types:
T ∋ t ::= word | int | sk | t∗
where, informally, word represents any value, int represents
any value used as an integer (i.e., not as a pointer), sk
represents the kth byte in a C structure s, and t∗ represents a
pointer to t. Note that s∗ in C (a pointer to a structure s) is
translated in our system into s0∗ (a pointer to the 0th byte of
s).
Labeling and memory. Consider the C code of Figure 6(a)9.
Compiling and running it produces (Figure 6(c)) both a
memory m ∈ A → V (mapping from addresses to values)
and a labeling L ∈ A → T (mapping from addresses to
types). The address 0x01 corresponds to &u.data, which
should hold the byte at offset 1 in a value of type foo; thus
the label of 0x01, L (0x01), is foo1.
Subtyping. Following the C types definition, we know that
addresses at offset 1 in foo structures are used to store
pointers to a bar structure (i.e. addresses whose label is bar0).
Thus, we want to say that 0x01 is also labeled by (bar0)∗.
9To simplify the presentation, we assume that every word, including
pointers, has size one byte.
We express this property as a subtyping relationship: foo1 is
a subtype of (bar0)∗ (written foo1 ⊑ (bar0)∗). The inclusion
t ⊑ u means that addresses labeled by t are also labeled by
u. This subtyping relationship is very important for programs
written in machine languages, and deals in particular with
the following issue. While accessing the field of a structure
(e.g., p = &(p->next)) is an explicit operation in C, it is
implicit in machine code (the previous statement is a no-op
when next has offset 0), thus requiring pointers to a structure
to simultaneously point to its first field.
Figure 6(b) provides the subtyping relations derived from
Figure 6(a). Formally, if s contains a t at offset o, then for all
k such that 0 ≤ k < sizeof(t): so+k ⊑ tk (where t0 = t in
the case of scalar types).
Types as set of values. In addition, labels also constrain the
values in memory: e.g., a cell a labeled with (bar0)∗ should
only contain addresses of cells b whose label is (bar0) (in the
example, both cells 0x01 and 0x05 must contain the address
0x02). This makes use of the second interpretation of types,
as sets of values; this interpretation depends on a labeling L .
Formally, we define the set of values LtML ∈ P(V) of a type
t ∈ T as follows:
LintML = LwordML = V
Lt∗ML = {a ∈ A : L (a) ⊑ t}
LskML =
⋂
t:sk⊑t
LtML
Here is an example explaining how the values that a memory
cell can hold are constrained. The address 0x05 is labeled by
bar3. The set values that an address of type bar3 can hold is
Lbar3ML = Lfoo1ML = Lbar0∗ML = {0x02}, which matches
the content of m at address 0x05.
Labeling for adjacent bytes. We require labelings L to
be consistent with pointer arithmetic, i.e. contiguous bytes
belonging to the same structure should have matching labels.
For instance, from the facts that address 0x03 has label bar1
and that the size of bar is 4 bytes, we know that address
0x03+ 2 = 0x05 has label bar1+2 = bar3. Formally, this is
expressed with the following constraint: ∀k ∈ N : ∀a ∈ A :
L (a) = so ∧ 0 ≤ o+ k < size(t) =⇒ L (a+ k) = so+k
Types and aliasing. An important property of our system
is that two addresses whose labels are not in a subtyping
relationship do not alias. For instance, two addresses whose
labels are bar0 and bar1 may not alias, but two addresses
with labels bar2 and foo0 may alias. This property is used by
our analysis to ensure that some parts of memory (like page
tables) are not modified by a memory store.
B. The type-based weak shape abstract domain T♯
We build our abstract domain T♯ upon preservation of the
labeling of memories: modifying a memory m for which L
is a labeling, results in a new memory m′, for which L is
still a labeling. This is a useful property: it means that cells
holding pointers to foo structures will always contain those,
typedef struct { foo ∗next; bar ∗data; } foo;
typedef struct { int x; int y; foo f; } bar;
foo u; bar v;
(a) Type and globals definitions in C
word
foo0∗ bar0∗int
foo0 foo1
bar0 bar1 bar2 bar3
(b) Subtyping relations derived from the C definitions
0x00
&u
0x01 0x02
&v
0x03 0x04 0x05
0x04 0x02 0x00 0xff 0x00 0x02


0x00 7→ foo0
0x01 7→ foo1
0x02 7→ bar0
0x03 7→ bar1
0x04 7→ bar2
0x05 7→ bar3


(c) Example concrete memory (m) and labeling (L )
Fig. 6. Typing a small memory
and cannot point to other data structures (such as page tables).
For instance, if there are no memory stores to addresses whose
label is a supertype of t, we have proved that addresses whose
label is t are read-only.
The reason why the type domain T♯ is an efficient shape
abstraction is that it does not track the contents of addresses
in the user image (the parameterized part, AP ) at all. It only
tracks the types of the values in registers R and memory cells
of the rest of the kernel (the fixed part, AF ), ensuring that
they point to appropriate addresses in AP .
Thus, our type domain T♯ = (AF ⊎ R) → T consists in a
mapping, tracking the type of the content of each register or
fixed-address memory cell. The meaning this abstract domain
is given using its concretization function [32] γT♯ , which is a
mapping from abstract values to the set of states they represent:
γT♯ : T
♯ → P(S)
γT♯(t
♯) = {(mem, regs) | ∃L : ∀r ∈ R : regs[r] ∈ Lt♯[r]ML
∧ ∀a ∈ AF : mem[a] ∈ Lt
♯[a]ML
∧ L is a labeling for mem }
In practice, the main operations of the domain consist
in handling pointer arithmetic (by communicating with the
numeric domain) to precisely track offsets inside structures;
using type information to retrieve the type of pointers for load
operations (e.g., loading from an address of type foo1∗ returns
an address of type bar0∗); and verifying the preservation of
the type upon stores (e.g., storing a value of type int into an
address of type foo1∗ makes the analysis fail with an error).
C. Additional features
Several extensions are required in the actual analysis to
successfully run our case study:
• We need to handle numerical properties over scalar types;
for instance values contained in flags field in Figure 2
should always have the “UNPRIVILEGED” bit set, or
data_segment does not intersect with the range of
kernel addresses (Figure 8 p.16);
• Another important extension is to handle null pointers.
Our type system distinguishes never-null and maybe-null
pointer types (the former being a subtype of the latter)
and issues alarms on null pointer dereferences;
• Lastly, the domain is extended to support arrays in
order to implement bound checking and to support type
annotations expressing the fact that the length of an array
is contained somewhere else in memory.
Appendix A (p.16) presents our complete annotation language.
VI. CASE STUDY & EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We seek to answer the following Research Questions:
RQ1: Effectiveness Can BINSEC/CODEX automatically ver-
ify absence of privilege escalation on a real microkernel?
RQ2: Internal evaluation What are the respective impacts of
the different elements of our analysis method?
RQ3: Scalability and analyzer performance How does
BINSEC/CODEX scale?
RQ4: Genericity Does BINSEC/CODEX work on different
kernels, hardware architectures and toolchains?
A. Experimental setup
Implementation. Our static analysis technique has been imple-
mented in BINSEC/CODEX, a plugin of the BINSEC [50]
framework for binary-level semantic analysis. We reuse the
intermediate-representation lifting and executable file parsing
of the platform, but reimplement a whole static analysis on top
of it, with adequate domains, including weak shapes. Devel-
opment is done in OCaml, the plugin counts around 41 kloc.
Case study. We consider an industrial case study: the mi-
crokernel of AnonymOS, a part of an industrial solution for
implementing security- and safety-critical real-time applica-
tions, used in industrial automation, automotive, aerospace
and defense industries. The kernel is being developed by
AnonymFirm—an SME whose engineers are not formal
method experts—using standard compiler toolchains. The
system is parameterized: the kernel and the user tasks are
compiled separately and both are loaded at runtime by the
bootloader, as explained in Section II-B.
We have analyzed a port of the kernel to a 4-cores ARM
Cortex-A9 processor with ARMv7 instruction set. It relies on
the ARM MMU for memory protection (pagination). The
executable file contains 1,746 instructions for the boot code
and 796 instructions for the runtime, totalizing 2,542 instruc-
tions— in line with the general practice of critical embedded
microkernels. We have analyzed two versions:
• BETA, a preliminary version where we found a
vulnerability;
• V1, a more polished version where AnonymFirm fixed the
vulnerability and removed some debug code.
TABLE I
MAIN VERIFICATION RESULTS
Generic annotations Specific annotations
# shape
annotations
generated 1057
manual
57 (5.11%) 58 (5.20%)
Kernel version BETA V1 BETA V1
invariant
computation
status ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
time (s) 647 417 599 406
# alarms in runtime
1 true error
2 false alarms
1 false
alarm
1 true error
1 false alarm
0 ✓
user tasks
checking
status ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
time (s) 32 29 31 30
Proves APE? N/A ∼ N/A ✓
Also, AnonymFirm provided us with a sample user image.
Experimental conditions. We performed our formal verifi-
cation completely independently from AnonymFirm activities.
In particular, we never saw the source code of the kernel, and
our interactions with AnonymFirm engineers were limited to a
general presentation of AnonymOS features and caracteristics
of the processor. We ran our analysis on a laptop with an Intel
Xeon E3-1505M 3 GHz CPU with 32 GB RAM.
B. Effectiveness (RQ1)
Protocol. The goal of our first experiment is to evaluate
the effectiveness of the approach, measured by: (1) the fact
that the method indeed succeeds in computing a non-trivial
invariant for the whole system, i.e., computes an invariant
under precondition for the kernel runtime and checks that the
user tasks establish the precondition; (2) the precision of the
analysis, measured by the number of alarms (i.e. assumptions
that the analyzer cannot prove); (3) the effort necessary to
setup the analysis, measured by the number of lines of manual
annotations; and (4) the performance of the analysis, measured
in CPU time and memory utilization.
We consider both kernel versions and two configurations
(i.e., sets of shape annotations):
• Generic contains types and parameter invariants which
must hold for all legitimate user image;
• Specific further assumes that the stacks of all user tasks
in the image have the same size. This is the default for
AnonymOS applications, and it holds on our case study.
Results. The main results are given in Table I. The generic
annotations consist in only 57 lines of manual annotations,
in addition to 1057 lines that were automatically generated
(i.e. 5 % of manual annotations). When analyzing the BETA
version with these annotations, only 3 alarms are raised in the
runtime:
• One is a true vulnerability: in the supervisor call entry
routine (written in manual assembly), the kernel extracts
the system call number from the opcode that triggered
the call, sanitizes it (ignoring numbers larger than 7), and
uses it as an index in a table to jump to the target system
call function; but this table has only 6 elements, and is
TABLE II
IMPACT OF THE METHODOLOGY.
Annotations No annotation Generated Minimal Generic Specific Dedicated
Generated annotations (total) 0 1057 1057 1057 1057 1057
Manual annotations (total) 0 0 10 57 58 62
boot runtime boot runtime boot runtime boot runtime boot runtime boot runtime
Analysis time (s) ✗ N/A ✗ N/A 342 394 195 222 187 219 151 203
Total number of alarms N/A N/A N/A N/A 85 13 60 1 59 0 43 0
User tasks checking N/A N/A ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
followed by a string in memory. This off-by-one error
allows a svc 6 system call to jump to an unplanned
(constant) location, which can be attacker-controlled in
some user images. The error is detected as the target of
the jump goes to a memory address whose content is not
known precisely, and that we thus cannot decode;
• One is a false alarm caused by debugging code temporar-
ily violating the shape constraints: the code writes the
constant 0xdeadbeef in a memory location that should
hold a pointer to a user stack (yielding an alarm as we
cannot prove that this constant is a valid address for this
type), and that memory location is always overwritten
with a correct value further in the execution;
• The last one is a false alarm caused by an imprecision in
our analyzer when user stacks can have different sizes.
When analyzing the V1 version, the first two alarms dis-
appear (no new alarm is added). Analyzing the kernel with
the specific annotations makes the last alarm disappear. In all
cases user tasks checking succeeds.
Analyzing the V1 kernel with the specific annotations allows
to reach 0 alarms, meaning that we have a fully-verified
invariant and a proof of absence of privilege escalation.
Computation time is always very low: less than 11 minutes
for the static analysis and 35 seconds for user tasks checking.
Conclusions. Experiments show that verifying absence of
privilege escalation of an industrial microkernel using only
fully-automated methods is feasible (albeit with a very slight
amount of manual annotations). Especially:
• The analysis is effective, in that it identifies real errors in
the code, and verifies their absence once removed;
• The analysis is very precise, we manage to reach 0 false
alarm on the correct code, and we had no more than 2
false alarms on each configuration of the analysis;
• The annotations burden is very small (58 simple lines), as
most of the annotations are extracted fully automatically;
• Finally, the analysis time, for a kernel whose size is
typical for microkernels, is very small (between 406 and
647 seconds). Analysis time would be even smaller (86
seconds) if the system had used a single core.
An additional finding is that verifying low-level code such
as the assembly parts of the kernel is essential: this code is
small but prone to errors, as witnessed by the one we found.
C. Evaluation of the methodology (RQ2)
Protocol. The goal of this experiment is to evaluate our 3-step
methodology (Section IV), in particular (1) whether our shape
domain is needed, (2) what is the nature and impact of the
shape annotations, and (3) whether differentiated handling of
boot code is mandatory.
We experiment on the V1 kernel version, and report results
for both the boot code and the runtime, using different sets of
annotations with an increasing amount of annotations:
• No annotation (equivalent to having no shape domain);
• Generated annotations (without any manual annotations);
• Minimal annotations with which the analysis terminate;
• Generic and Specific are the annotations defined above;
• Dedicated hardcodes some parameters, such as the num-
ber of tasks, with values of the sample user tasks.
Results. Table II shows the result of this evaluation. The
analysis does not succeed in finding an invariant without the
shape domain or without manual annotations— the analysis is
too imprecise and aborts in boot, denoted ✗. Only 10 lines of
manual annotations are necessary for the analysis to complete
(minimal), albeit with many alarms in both boot code and
runtime. These annotations mainly limit the range of array
indices to prevent overflows in pointer arithmetic. The generic
configuration adds 47 lines indicating which pointer types or
structure fields may be null, which fields hold array indices,
and relating array lengths with memory locations holding
these lengths. This configuration eliminates most alarms in the
runtime, but 60 alarms remain in the boot code. The specific
annotations reach 0 alarms in runtime, but still 59 alarms in
boot code. Even the dedicated annotations cannot eliminate
all alarms in boot code.
Interestingly, we also found that some of the invariants in
the generated annotations do not hold before boot.
Conclusions. Parameterized verification of the kernel cannot
be done without the shape domain. The ability to extract the
shape configuration from types is extremely useful, as 95%
of the annotations are automatically extracted, requiring only
57 lines of simple manual annotations. Finally, differentiated
handling of boot code is necessary as both the boot code
is much harder to analyze than the runtime, and the shape
invariants holds only after boot code terminates.
D. Scalability and analyzer performance (RQ3)
Protocol. We now turn to scalability and performance.
(1) First, we specialize the generic shape annotations to fix
the number of tasks in the system to different constant values,
in order to assess its scalability w.r.t. the number of tasks.
(2) Second, we examine the interpretation of the boot code and
measure the number of instructions executed deterministically
– i.e. instructions whose inputs and outputs are singleton
values. This is important regarding user tasks checking, as such
instructions can be analyzed exactly using efficient concrete
(non-abstract) interpretation.
Results. Results of the first experiment are given in Table III.
As expected, the execution time variations between different
numbers of tasks are very low. Actually, fixing the number
of tasks provides only a slight speedup compared to the case
where this number is unknown.
TABLE III
SCALABILITY EXPERIMENT
Number of tasks 10 103 107 unknown
Static analysis time (s) 380 387 388 406
Static analysis memory (GB) 5.3 5.6 5.6 5.8
For the second experiment, out of 111,491 executed instruc-
tions on the boot code, 111,447 (99.96%) were deterministic.
The remaining instructions were all related to low-level device
driver initialization (reading MMIO values), and were indepen-
dent from the user image.
Conclusion. Our static analysis scales well to an arbitrary
number of user tasks. Moreover, almost every instruction
in the boot code is executed deterministically and can thus
be executed using efficient concrete interpretation. Finally,
our technique performance is in line with the fastest OS
verification methods (Table IV).
E. Genericity (RQ4)
Protocol. We now assess the genericity of our approach.
We apply our tool to EducRTOS, [51] a small academic
OS developed for teaching purpose. It is both a separation
kernel (with task isolation) and a real-time OS. Interestingly,
EducRTOS differs significantly from AnonymOS: it runs on
x86 (32 bit) and memory protection relies on segmentation.
We consider 6 variants, using two compilers (clang-8.0.1
and gcc-9.2.0) and three different optimization levels (O1,
O2, O3). The code contains between 2.7 and 6.3 kbytes of
instructions.
Results. We verify absence of privilege escalation on all
variants, in less than 3 seconds each. The same annotations (12
manual lines, 144 automatically extracted) are used to verify
all variants. There is no alarm in the runtime, and 5 alarms in
the boot code, that our method allows to ignore.
Conclusion. Together with the AnonymOS case study, these
results show that BINSEC/CODEX can be used in a variety
of OS projects, and is robust to small variations in the OS
binary.
VII. DISCUSSION
Threats to validity. Perhaps the main limitation of our work
is the need to trust our static analyzer and user tasks checker.
We mitigate this problem the following way. Our prototype is
implemented as part of BINSEC [50] whose robustness have
been demonstrated in prior large scale studies [52]–[55]. Espe-
cially, the IR lifting part has been exhaustively tested [56] and
positively evaluated in an independent study [39]. Moreover,
the user tasks checker is simple and share many components
with the analyzer, allowing to crosschecks results between
interpretation and full analysis. Finally, results have been
crosschecked for consistency between versions, and all alarms
on runtime have been manually investigated. It would be
possible to further reduce the trust base by using a verified
static analyzer [57], albeit with an important performance
penalty.
Representativity of the case studies. We have verified an
industrial kernel designed for safety-critical and hard real-time
applications, whose size and complexity are in line with the
general practice of these fields. While this kernel is indeed
more restricted than a general-purpose OS [8], [20], [58] –
no dynamic task creation nor dynamic re-purpose of memory,
fixing memory partitioning is standard in embedded [6], [14]–
[17], [24] and highly-secure [7] systems.
Regarding the verification itself, the analysis does not
sidesteps any major difficulty: the kernel was unmodified, it
runs concurrently, it initializes itself and creates its memory
protection tables dynamically, we have verified all of the
kernel code – including boot and the assembly parts, and our
verification is parameterized. Finally, we have shown that the
analysis works on differing setups (architecture, protection).
Scope of verification. The property that we target, absence
of privilege escalation, is weaker than, e.g., task separation
or full functional correctness [8], [12], [18], [20], [22]–[24],
[58]. Indeed, most existing OS verification efforts (Table IV),
if completed, would imply APE as a byproduct. On the other
hand, APE is a universal property over OS kernels, is essential
to security (Theorem 4) and must be proved in any complete
formal verification effort. In some systems it is even the main
property of interest [10].
Degree of automation. While we do use only fully-automated
methods, we still had to write a small amount of manual anno-
tations (58 lines for AnonymOS and 12 lines for EducRTOS)
to complete our main analysis. These annotations are not state
invariants, but configure the analysis so that state invariants can
be inferred. Some annotation is unavoidable in a parameterized
verification as the AnonymOS kernel does not ensure APE
for arbitrary user tasks images. Still, the annotation effort is
extremely low compared to prior work.
Limits. As already stated, our binary-level static analysis
cannot handle dynamic task spawning, dynamic memory re-
partitioning, code self-modification, code generation and re-
cursion. The last limitation could be overcome with state of
the art techniques (possibly at the price of precision), the other
ones lay at the forefront of program analysis research.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Formal verification of OS kernels. Table IV presents a
comprehensive overview of prior OS verification efforts. We
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF KERNEL VERIFICATION EFFORTS
VERIFIED KERNEL VERIFIED PROPERTY VERIFICATION TECHNIQUE CASE STUDY
Verified
property
Implies
APE?
Degree of
automation
Verif.
Level
Parame-
terized
Multi-
core
Infers
invariants
Manual
Annotations (LoC)
Unproved
code (LoC)
Non-
invasive
Analysis
time (s)
This work
Absence of
priv. escalation
✓
Fully
automated
Machine ✓ ✓ ✓ 58✓ 0 ✓ ✓ 406
XMHF [10]
Memory
integrity
✗
b Semi
automated
Source ✗h ✓ ✗ N/A
422 (C)
+ 388 (asm)
✗ 76
u¨XMHF [11]
Security
properties
✓
Semi
automated
Source +
assembly
✗
h ✗ ✗ 5,544 0 ✓ ✗ 3,739
Verve
Nucleus [2]
Type Safety ✓
Semi
automated
Assembly ✓ ✗ ✗ 4,309 0 ✓ ✗ 272
Prosper [24], [30]
Compliance with
specification
✓
Semi
automated
Machine ✗i ✗ ✗ 6,400
c 0 ✓ ✗ ≤ 28,800
Baby hyper-
visor [23], [25]
Compliance with
specification
✓
Semi
automated
Source+
assembly
✓ ✗ ✗ 8,200 tokens 0 ✓ ✗ 4,571
Komodo [12]
Compliance with
specification
✓
Semi
automated
Assembly ✓ ✗ ✗ 18,655 0 ✓ ✗ 14,400
UCLA Secure
Unix [20]
Compliance with
specification
✓ Manual Source ✓ ✗ ✗ N/A 80% ✗ N/A
Kit [18]
Compliance with
specification
✓ Manual Machine ✗ ✗ ✗
1,020 definitions
+ 3561 lemmas
0 ✓ ✗ N/A
µC/OS-II [22]
Compliance with
specification
✓
a Manual Source ✓ ✗f ✗ 34,887 d 37% ✓ 57,600e
SeL4 [8], [19]
Compliance with
specification
✓
a Manual Sourceg ✓ ✗ ✗ 200,000
1,200 (C, boot)
+ 500 (asm)
✗ N/A
CertiKOS [58]
Compliance with
specification
✓ Manual
Sourceg+
assembly
✓ ✓ ✗ 100,000 0 ✓ ✗ N/A
a Assuming that the proof is completed to cover all the code. b Control flow integrity is assumed. c Generated from a 21,000 lines of HOL4 manual proof.
d Plus 181,054 LoC of specification and support libraries. e The reported compilation time includes the support libraries. f The verification is concurrent because of in-
kernel preemptions. g The translation to assembly is also verified. h The hypervisor supports a single guest i The hypervisor supports two guests
already discussed the scope of verification in Section VII. Note
that most existing works leave unchecked hypotheses about
the code, assuming for instance control flow integrity [10],
semantics preservation of the compilation [11], [23] or correct-
ness of some unverified parts of the code [19], [20], [22]— in
particular assembly and boot code.
Fully-automated kernel verification: We qualified as fully-
automated the techniques that are able to infer invariants au-
tomatically. Vasudevan et al. [11] used abstract interpretation
in combination with deductive verification and runtime moni-
toring to verify manual annotations. Despite not inferring the
invariants, some verification techniques feature an advanced
level of automation. Vasudevan et al. [10] uses bounded model
checking to verify hand-written proof obligations, with the
help of manual verification statements. Dam et al. [24], [30]
designed their kernel so that it requires assertions only at the
beginning and end of the kernel, and most of these assertions
are generated automatically from a formal model.
Machine-level kernel verification: Only two previous efforts
target machine code [18], [30]. Both approaches are based on
a flat memory model, and thus cannot handle parameterized
number of tasks.
We propose BINSEC/CODEX, the first fully automated
approach able to verify absence of privilege escalation on
microkernels. Our approach is also the first fully automated
OS verification method enabling binary-level reasoning and
parameterized reasoning. While we focus on the key property
of APE, we are confident that the method can be extended
to stronger properties such as task separation. Finally, our
method can complement existing—more manual— techniques
to OS verification, either by automatically inferring parts of
the annotations and discharging parts of the proof obligations,
or by helping to prove unchecked low-level assumptions.
Static analysis of machine code. Relevant sound techniques
were discussed in Section IV-D. Most of them either make
no assumption at all (raw binary) [33], [41] at the price of
precision, or rely on implicit extra assumptions (standardly-
compiled code) [27].
We pick best practices from existing sound analyses—any
progress there can be directly reused in our method. Our two
main novelties are (1) to make checked explicit assumptions
about data layout described by C types, and (2) to specialize
our approach to the typical kernel architecture, computing an
invariant (of the runtime) under precondition (established by
boot code) and adding an extra precondition checking step.
Several existing works drop soundness and only compute
“best effort invariants” [59], [60] in order to gain robustness
[59] or to guide latter analysis [55]. This is not an option for
us as we look for formal verification of APE. Finally, symbolic
execution is widely used on machine code [50], [61]–[65] but
aims to find bugs rather than to prove their absence.
Fully-automated memory analyses. Points-to and alias anal-
yses are fast and easy to setup but are too imprecise for formal
verification, and generally assume that the code behaves nicely,
e.g., type-based alias analyses [66] assume that programs
comply with the strict aliasing rule – while kernel codes often
do not conform to C standard [19]. On the other hand, shape
analyses [28], [29] can fully prove memory invariants, but
require heavy parametrization and are generally too slow to
scale to a full microkernel.
Our weak type-based shape abstract domain hits a middle
ground: it is fast, precise, handles low-level behaviors (outside
of the C standard) and requires little configuration. This is also
the first shape analysis performed on machine code.
Marron [67] also describes a weak shape domain performing
only weak updates, but on a type-safe language with no im-
plicit type casts, pointer arithmetic, nor nested data structures.
Type-based verification of memory invariants. Walker et
al. [20] already observes in the 1980’s that reasoning on type
invariants is well suited to OS kernel verification. Several
systems build around this idea [2], [12], leveraging a dedicated
typed language. Cohen et al. [68] describe a typed semantics
for C with additional checks for memory typing preservation,
similar to our own checks on memory accesses. While they use
it in a deductive verification tool for C (to verify an hypervisor
[23]), we build an abstract interpreter for machine code.
IX. CONCLUSION
Operating system kernels are the keystones of computer
system security, leading to several efforts towards their formal
verification. Yet, while these prior works were overall suc-
cessful, they often require a huge amount of manual efforts,
and verification was often led only at source level, on crafted
kernels. We focus in this paper on the key requirement that
a kernel should protect itself, coined as absence of privilege
escalation, and provide a methodology to verify it from the
kernel executable only, using fully automated methods with a
very low amount of manual configuration. Our methodology
handles parameterized systems thanks to a novel type-based
weak shape abstract domain. The technique has been success-
fully demonstrated on two embedded microkernels, including
an industrial one: with less than 60 lines of manual annotations,
we were able to find a vulnerability in a preliminary version
and to verify absence of privilege escalation in a secure
version, without any remaining false alarm.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains:
A. The annotation language used to define the types manipu-
lated by the weak shape domain;
B. The concrete semantics that we use as a model of a
hardware architecture;
C. the abstract domains used in our analysis.
A. Annotation language
Annotations take the form of type declarations similar to
those of the C language, except that numerical properties may
be specified on values and array sizes. The annotation language
is presented in Figure 7, and the shape annotations required
for the example kernel of Figure 2 is presented in Figure 8.
An example of code for an user image is given in Figure 9.
〈constant〉 ::= 1 | 2 | · · ·
〈bitsize〉 ::= 〈constant〉
〈comp〉 ::= == | ! = | <u | ≤u | >u
| ≥u | <s | ≤s | >s | ≥s
〈binop〉 ::= + | ∗ | − | /u | /s
| ≪ | ≫u | ≫s| & | ”|”
〈variable〉 ::= nb tasks | kernel last address | · · ·
〈expr〉 ::= 〈constant〉 | 〈variable〉 | self
| 〈expr〉 〈binop〉 〈expr〉
〈predicate〉 ::= 〈expr〉 〈comp〉 〈expr〉
| 〈predicate〉 or 〈predicate〉
〈type〉 ::= int〈bitsize〉
| 〈type〉 with 〈predicate〉
| 〈label〉 ∗ | 〈label〉?
| struct { 〈type〉 ⋆ }
| 〈type〉 [〈constant〉 | 〈variable〉 | unknown]
〈typedecl〉 ::= type 〈label〉 = 〈type〉
〈annots〉 ::= 〈typedecl〉 ⋆
Fig. 7. Annotation language for configuring the shape domain
#define READ 1
#define WRITE 2
#define EXEC 4
type mpu = int64 with
(self | WRITE == 0) or
((self ≫u 32) >u kernel last addr) or
(((self ≪ 32) ≫u 32) <u kernel first addr)
#define UNPRIVILEGED 1
type flags = int32 with (self | UNPRIVILEGED) != 0
type Task = struct { int32 int32 flags mpu mpu Task∗ }
Fig. 8. Shape annotations configuring the analysis for the example kernel
B. Semantics of an architecture with memory protection
Here, we instantiate the formalization of Section III by
providing a formal model of a computer using operating
system software controlling the use of hardware privilege.
Such a definition is necessary to define and prove correct
a static analysis which computes sets of possible concrete
execution described by this model.
States. Values V are machine integers (e.g. V = [0, 232 − 1]).
A ⊆ V is the set of memory addresses. A memory m ∈ M
is just a mapping from addresses to values, i.e., M = A→ V.
We note R the set of register names in the system; in the
example of Section II, this includes for instance “mpu1” and
“sp”; or “r0” and “r11” on ARMv7 processors.
void code(void){
while(true){ print(”Hello\n”); asm(”software interrupt”); }
}
void after code(void) {}
#define STACK SIZE 256
char stack0[STACK SIZE], stack1[STACK SIZE];
Task task0 = {
.sp = &stack0[STACK SIZE−sizeof(int)];
.pc = &code;
.flags = 0 | UNPRIVILEGED;
.code segment =
&code ≪ 32 | &after code | READ | EXEC;
.data segment =
&stack0 ≪ 32 | &stack0[STACK SIZE] | READ | WRITE;
.next = &task1;
};
Task task1 = {
.sp = &stack1[STACK SIZE−sizeof(int)];
.pc = &code;
.flags = 0 | UNPRIVILEGED;
.code segment =
&code ≪ 32 | &after code | READ | EXEC;
.data segment =
&stack1 ≪ 32 | &stack1[STACK SIZE] | READ | WRITE;
.next = &task0;
};
Fig. 9. Example of code producing a user image for the example kernel
States S are tuples of M× (R → V) where each state s has
a memory s.mem ∈ M, and a mapping s.regs ∈ R → V of
registers’ names to their values.
RegistersR = RS⊎RU are partitioned into system registers
RS and user registers RU . In a secure system, only the
kernel is able to modify system registers, using the following
mechanism.
Execution level and privilege. States are partitioned between
privileged (i.e., supervisor-level) or unprivileged (i.e., user-
level) states. Generally, privileged corresponds to the value
of a bit in a system register like flags in Figure 2.
Transitions between unprivileged states cannot change the
values in the system registers. Moreover when a state is
unprivileged, the only way for its successor to be privileged
is by performing a interrupt transition, detailed below.
Transitions. The transitions (regular and interrupt) have al-
ready been described in Section III-B1. In a (standard, Von
Neumann) machine execution, getting the next instruction
correspond to fetching in memory the opcode pointed by the
program counter, then decoding it:
next(s) , decode(s.mem[s.regs[pc]])
We do not detail the format of instructions, as it is standard;
in our tool it is encoded as a sequence of basic instructions of
DBA intermediate language of the BINSEC tool [38].
The interrupt transition
interrupt
→ corresponds to the reception
of a hardware or software interrupt. This transition 1. makes
s′ privileged, 2. changes s′.regs[pc] to a specific label that
we call the kernel entry point, and 3. possibly performs other
operations, such as saving the values of registers in system
registers or memory.
Memory protection. A key component of any OS kernel
invariant consists in ensuring that the memory protection is
properly set up. Indeed memory protection and hardware
privilege are the two mechanisms that the kernel must use
to protect itself from the user code, and a vulnerable memory
protection generally leads to a possible privilege escalation.
The memory protection is modeled as follows. A predicate
accessible : S × A → P{R,W,X} returns the access rights
for an address a in a state s. A state can perform a regular
transition only if it can access all the memory addresses
that are needed for fetching and executing this instruction;
otherwise it must perform an interrupt transition.
The accessible predicates generalizes every memory protec-
tion mechanism found in usual hardware (note that memory
translation can be encoded if needed in the semantics of
instructions). In some systems (e.g., based on Memory Pro-
tection Units), accessible depends only on the value of some
system registers. This means that unprivileged code cannot
change the set of accessible addresses directly (an indirect
attack is still possible, by having the kernel load corrupt data
in system registers). In other systems (e.g., based on Memory
Management Units), accessible also depends on addresses in
memory pointed by a system register (the memory protection
tables, for instance page tables). This makes possible a direct
attack where unprivileged code modifies memory protection
tables directly, if some of the addresses of the memory
protection tables in use are accessible.
Multiprocessor. In multiprocessor systems, the state is a tuple
of M × (R→ V)
n
, where n is the number of processors.
For simplicity’s sake we focus our explanation on the single-
processor case: the system is assumed to have only one
processor unless where explicitely mentioned.
C. Description of the static analysis
In this section we present (with some simplifications) a
formal description of our binary-level static analyzer.
Background. When given a transition system 〈S, S0,→〉,
static analysis by abstract interpretation [32] allows to compute
a finite representation of a super-set of the reachable states. As
a set of states is isomorphic to a property over states, this finite
representation also corresponds to a state property. Abstract
interpretation is sound—the computed invariants are correct
by construction— , and can thus be used as a proof technique.
Abstract interpretation works by combining abstract do-
mains, i.e. partially-ordered sets of abstract values, each
representing a set of concrete values. Formally, the meaning
of an abstract value d♯ belonging to an abstract domain
D♯ is given by its concretization, which is a function γ
♯
D
:
D
♯ → P(D) mapping abstract value to the set of concrete
values it represent. For instance, intervals 〈a, b〉 are finite
representations of (possibly infinite) sets of integers, e.g.,
γ (〈3,+∞〉) = {x ∈ Z | 3 ≤ x}.
state domain S♯ = C♯ × D♯
control flow domain C♯ = P(P(L× L))
data flow domain D♯ = L→ M♯
storage domain M♯ = N♯ × T♯
numeric domain N♯ = any conjunction of numeric constraints
over the values bound to AF and R
type domain T♯ = (AF ⊎R) → T
T is the set of types, AF the set of fixed addresses in the kernel,
R the set of register names, L the set of program locations.
Fig. 10. Implementation of the abstract domains.
The set of reachable states in a 〈S, S0,→〉 transition system
is formally defined as follows. We define a function F :
F : P(S)→ P(S)
F (S) = S0 ∪ S ∪ {s
′ | ∃s ∈ S : s→ s′}
such that the set of states reachable from S0 is defined as the
least fixpoint of F (noted lfp(F )), i.e., is the smallest set S
such that F (S) = S.
The computation of an invariant using abstract interpretation
mimics this definition. Given an abstract domain S♯ represent-
ing the set of states S, a concretization function γ : S♯ → S,
and a sound approximation F ♯ : S♯ → S♯ of F , i.e. such that
∀S♯ ∈ S♯ : F (γS♯(S
♯)) ⊆ γS♯(F
♯(S♯))
then every postfixpoint P ♯ of F ♯, i.e. such that F ♯(P ♯) ⊑S♯ P
♯
will be a sound approximation of lfp(F ), i.e.:
lfp(F ) ⊆ γS♯(P
♯)
A postfixpoint of F ♯ can be computed by upward iteration
sequences with widening [32], which consists in growing the
abstract value until it cannot grow any more (which means we
found a postfixpoint).
In general, abstract domains are proved and designed in a
modular way by composition of abstract domains [36]. The
concretizations functions are used to establish the soundness
of the transfer functions, describing how the abstract state is
modified by the → transition.
In the remainder of this section we will explain the main
abstractions we use, but will give only informal presentation
of the transfer functions (as they follow from the semantics
and from the concretization), and we will omit the soundness
proofs. For the sake of simplicity, all of our abstract domains
concretize into sets of states P(S).
Main state abstraction. Static analysis of machine code
needs to analyse simultaneously the control flow and the data
flow, as each depends on the other. To this end, our main
abstraction combines a control-flow abstractionC♯ with a data-
flow abstraction D♯, in a manner similar to [41].
Central to our abstractions is the notion of program loca-
tions L. What is a program location is an implementation
choice of the analyzer: a natural choice is to consider that a
program locations is a kernel address (i.e., a precise address in
the kernel code segment). In our case study we chose a more
precise abstraction: a program location consists in a kernel
address with a call stack. We denote by L (s) the program
location of a state s.
Then, our control flow abstraction C♯ is a graph between
program locations L. This graph is represented as the set of
its edges P(L×L). The meaning of a graph c♯ is that (1) the
only reachable program locations are the nodes in the graph,
and (2) the only possible location after executing a state whose
location is ℓ1 is a location ℓ2 where ℓ2 is a successor of ℓ1 in
the graph. Formally:
γC♯(c
♯) = { s1 ∈ S | ∃ 〈ℓ1, ℓ2〉 ∈ c
♯ : ∃s2 ∈ S : s1 → s2
∧ L (s1) = ℓ1 ∧ L (s2) = ℓ2 }
The data-flow abstraction D♯ = L → M♯ maps each
program location ℓ to a storage abstraction m♯—described
hereafter— representing the values in the memory and regis-
ters. It is the standard abstraction for flow-sensitive analyses
[32], [69], [70]. Its meaning is that the memory and value of
registers for a state with program location ℓ must correspond
to what is described in the storage abstraction. Formally:
γD♯(d
♯) = { s ∈ S | ∃ℓ ∈ L : ℓ = L (s) ∧ s ∈ γM♯(d
♯[ℓ]) }
The main state abstraction S♯ simply consists in a prod-
uct [36] of these previous abstractions. It represents a set of
states that must match both abstractions. Formally:
γS♯(c
♯, d♯) = γC♯(c
♯) ∩ γD♯(d
♯)
The analysis works by performing multiple rounds of the
following steps in sequence:
1) Perform a standard data-flow analysis using the current
CFG c♯, to compute a new d♯ ∈ D♯.
2) Iterate over all locations l ∈ c♯ to compute all pos-
sible outgoing edges, given the possible memories at
the instruction entry d♯[l] (this uses the same resolve
function than [41]). Newly-discovered edges are added to
the CFG c♯.
The iteration sequence starts with an abstraction (c♯0, d
♯
0) of
the initial states S0. In our case study, this corresponds to
c
♯
0 containing only the first instruction in the kernel, and d
♯
0
representing a mapping from this instruction to every possible
initial values of memory and registers (obtained from the
kernel executable file, plus system registers indicating that the
interrupt received is a RESET). The analysis terminates when
the fixpoint is reached, i.e., no new edge is discovered in the
CFG. In practice, several small optimisations are used to reuse
results between rounds (e.g., caching the results), and to have
fewer rounds (by early exploration of the newly-discovered
CFG nodes).
Theorem 5. If the transfer functions for M♯ are sound, the
result s
♯
final of the analysis is a sound abstraction of all the
reachable states in the system (and thus a state invariant).
In our case study we use the checked hypothese that kernel-
controlled code is at a fixed location and is not modified (i.e.,
we have no self-modifying nor dynamic loading of code). This
hypothese is checked by verifying that no memory store can
modify a read-only region (see Figure 11), and reporting an
error if this happens.
Memory storage abstraction. The memory storage abstrac-
tion M♯ represents the contents of all the storage in the
system, i.e., memory cells and registers. Its concretization has
signature:
γM♯ : M
♯ → P(S)
where S = (A→ V)× (R → V) is a pair of a memory (map
from addresses to values) and values of registers (map from
register names to values).
0x00 0x?? 0xc0 0xd4 0xff
writable read-only
parameterized AP fixed AF
unprotected memory protected memory
Fig. 11. Partitioning of addresses A
The structure of this abstraction is derived from how we
can partition the memory in the system into the following
parts (see Figure 11):
• Unprotected memory: adresses that may be modified by
non-kernel code.
• Protected memory: protected addresses, i.e., memory pro-
tection should be set up so that these addresses cannot be
modified by non-kernel code. This part is sub-partitioned
into:
– Fixed part (AF ), containing data structures whose
addresses do not depend on the running application
(and whose addresses are at a fixed location in the
kernel executable file). Addresses in this part can be
further distinguished; in particular writable addresses
(containing the stack, and global variables like cur in
the example kernel) are distinguished from read-only
addresses, containing the code, jump tables, strings,
etc.
– Parameterized part (AP ), containing the data structures
whose number and size depends on the application; like
the circular list of tasks in the example kernel.
Following this partition, our main storage abstraction M♯
is a product N♯ × T♯ of two different storage abstractions
corresponding to the different memory parts that we need to
track:
• A precise numerical abstraction N♯, whose purpose is
to track precisely the numerical values contained in
the memory cells of the fixed address part, and in the
registers; obtained by standard [71] lifting of a numerical
domain into a domain handling numerical properties of a
fixed number of memory locations;
• A typed abstraction T♯ representing the contents of the
parameters part, and its relation with the registers and
fixed-address part, detailed in Section V.
Note that the unprotected memory is supposed to be suject
to arbitrary modifications from an attacker, so no abstraction
needs to keep track of its possible contents.
M♯ is a standard product of the N♯ and T♯ abstractions, so
its concretization is defined simply as:
γM♯(n
♯, t♯) = γN♯(n
♯) ∩ γT♯(t
♯)
The above is a simplified formalization of our real abstrac-
tion, and additional extensions are necessary to make it work
in practice (see Section IV-D).
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